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1. England and Wales act under the Charities Act 2011 with the Charity Commission for England and Wales; Scotland boasts the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR), which operates
under the Charities and Trustees’ Investment Act (Scotland) 2005, while in Northern Ireland the principal agency is the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland (CCNI) which operates under the Charities
Acts (Northern Ireland) 2008-2013.
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When it comes to the regulation of non-profits in a European context,
some explanation is always required. First, what do we mean by European?
Is it meant as a shorthand term for the individual approaches of the various
Member States, all 28 of which comprise the European Union? Or, does it
refer more specifically to the institutional confederated approach of the EU,
acting through the auspices of the European Commission or expressing its
views through the European Council or Parliament? Adopting the first approach leads to a kaleidoscope of events and developments as each Member State, as we shall see, retains sovereignty to regulate charities in
accordance with its own national laws and policies. The fact that European
countries operate under either a common law or civil law legal system adds
another layer of complexity to the regulatory scene and results in Member
States lacking a common regulatory language and culture when it comes to
promulgating non-profit laws. Even within single Member States, there can
be additional wrinkles when discussion turns to the enforcement of charity
law. In the United Kingdom alone, one finds three different pieces of charity legislation, creating three different charity regulators; each jurisdiction
with its own nuanced way of applying the law. 1
If, instead, one chooses to descend down the rabbit hole of the “European regulation of non-profits,” an equally murky world emerges. The European Union draws its competency from those areas of law, which under
its treaties Member States have ceded to or shared with it. In those areas in
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2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3, Mar. 30,
2010,
2010
O.J.
(C
83)
53
[hereinafter
TFEU]
(text
available
at
http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/qc3209190enc_002.pdf#page=52).
3. THE EU CUSTOMS UNION: PROTECTING PEOPLE AND FACILITATING TRADE, EUROPEAN
COMM’N (Nov. 2014), http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/customs_en.pdf.
4. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 4.
5. Id. art. 6.
6. Id. art. 5.
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which it has exclusive competence, only the EU can act. 2 Examples of such
areas would include monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro, and matters relating to the customs union. 3 In areas in which
competence is shared between the EU and Member States, such as the internal market, agriculture and fisheries and development cooperation and
humanitarian aid, Member States can act only if the EU has chosen not to.4
In other words, EU action in a given field has the capacity to crowd out
individual Member State competence to act.
Remaining areas falling outside these categories can be further divided
in two, namely: areas in which the EU has competence to support, coordinate or supplement actions of the Member States 5 and areas in which the
EU has competence to provide arrangements within which EU Member
States must coordinate policy. 6 In the case of the former, covering matters
ranging from culture, tourism, industry, civil protection and the promotion
of health, the EU may not adopt legally binding acts that require the Member States to harmonize their laws and regulations. In the latter instance,
Member State coordination is required in the areas of economic and social
policy and employment.
When it comes to the European regulation of non-profits, the European Commission faces many of the same pressures and constraints experienced at a national level. It suffers, however, from an additional
disadvantage in that, arguably, it lacks jurisdictional competence to regulate non-profits qua non-profits. One might compare this situation, not
unfairly, to one of federal-state competency: while a federal legislator may
have a better overview of the broader regulatory issue and perhaps a macro
solution to hand, in the absence of state relinquishment of sovereignty (or,
at least, a willingness amongst states to coordinate their individual approaches along federal lines), the federal regulator will be powerless to
intervene. The European Commission has experienced the harsh reality of
this situation in its recent bruising and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to
secure the passage of the proposal for a European Foundation Statute
(“EFS”). Although the requirement for Member State unanimity and the
European Council’s inability to deliver this level of consensus scuppered
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Apart from the obvious connections with development cooperation
and humanitarian aid, in which competence is shared, the more general
regulation of the broader church of non-profit organizations falls into the
zone in which the EU may not adopt legally binding acts that require
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the Commission’s proposal, failure to pass the proposed regulation has not
relieved the Commission of the problems it identified as giving rise to the
need for the EFS in the first instance.
Part I reviews the rationale for the EFS proposal, the political concerns that left it vulnerable to veto and highlights the structural challenges
faced by the Commission when it comes to legislating for non-profits at a
European level. The argument is advanced that extant a purely functional
approach, European regulation of non-profits from “the inside out” is difficult in the absence of a valid treaty basis.
Switching from a European Commission besieged in its non-profit
regulatory attempts by legislative limitations and lack of Member State
buy-in, we turn to another regulator whose non-profit oversight has become
a subject of increasing scrutiny. Since the events of 9/11, the Financial
Action Task Force (“FATF”) has concerned itself not just with the development of anti-money laundering measures but also with counter terrorist
financing regulation. This latter responsibility led it to introduce non-profit
oriented recommendations and best practice principles to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable non-profits. The national rollout of these intended
protective measures has led some governments to over-regulate nonprofits
in the name of security. Accepting criticisms that despite the noble intentions behind the FATF’s non-profit recommendations, their widespread
application to charities had been disproportionally negative, the FATF embarked upon a review of its guidance on non-profit vulnerability.
Part II examines NGO attempts to influence the FATF reform process
and efforts, supported by the European Commission, to extract a fairer
process for dealing with NGOs under FATF Recommendation 8. The
Commission’s role in assisting NGOs to bring pressure on the FATF to be
more accountable and transparent in its dealings with the sector presents an
interesting vignette of one regulator laying siege to another in the greater
good of better non-profit oversight. The Commission’s involvement in
“regulating from the outside in” has arguably strengthened NGO relations
and resulted in the Commission demanding a higher level of transparency
of the FATF than it itself has been willing to provide to NGOs in the past.
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7. Id. art. 54 (ex art. 48 TEC) (“Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business
within the Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons
who are nationals of Member States. ‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under
civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or
private law, save for those which are non-profit-making.”) (emphasis added).
8. The Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 1, 2003, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 44. The treaty was
signed by European leaders on February 26, 2001, but came into force on February 1, 2003.
9. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 300.
10. See PLATFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL NGOS, DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN
NGOS: BUILDING A STRONGER STRUCTURED CIVIL DIALOGUE 2–3, 6 (2001),
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/contributions/social-ngos_en.pdf.
11. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 11.
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Member States to harmonize their laws and regulations but must rather
work to support actions of the Member States. Indeed, one has to search the
treaties carefully to find mere mention of non-profit organizations and their
treatment under European law. The founding Treaty of Rome expressly
excluded non-profit bodies from the fundamental freedom of establishment. 7 This is perhaps not surprising when one considers that the Treaty of
Rome dealt with the establishment of the European Economic Community,
the emphasis clearly placed on for-profit rather than non-profit activity.
The 2001 Nice Treaty 8 amended Article 257 of the TEC to make reference
in the treaties for the very first time to “civil society,” including in the
membership of the European Economic and Social Committee “parties
representative of civil society.” 9 Nice left the scope and extent of civil society, however, entirely undefined. NGOs quickly sought to build upon this
treaty reference, calling for the introduction of a further treaty article to
give a legal basis to structured civil dialogue and legitimate the various
initiatives taken by the Commission to instigate a civil dialogue. 10
Nine years later, Article 11 of the Treaty of Lisbon went one step further by providing for “an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society” and the European institutions.11
Moreover, Article 15 of the TFEU (Article 255 of the TEC) now declares
that “in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of
civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall
conduct their work as openly as possible,” leaving open the possibility for
stakeholders such as NGOs to be both better informed and more influential
in the European institutional decision-making process than in previous eras.
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in recent
years has also further strengthened the rights of NGOs within European
law. Case law now firmly establishes that the right of free movement of
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12. See Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für
Körperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. I-8203.
13. See Case C- +HLQ 3HUVFKH Y )LQDQ]DPW /XࡇGHQVFKHLG  (&5 ,-00359,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-318/07 (follow “Curia” link under “Judgment”); Case C-25/10, Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV v. Belgium, 2011 E.C.R. I-00497,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-25/10 (same); Case C-39/04, Laboratoires
Fournier SA v. Direction des vérifications nationales et internationals, 2005 E.C.R. I-2068; Case C10/10, Commission v. Austria, 2011 E.C.R. I-05389,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-10/10 (same).
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capital applies to non-profit organizations. 12 Equally, in the area of tax law
the application of the “non-discrimination principle” has forced (sometimes
reluctant) Member States to treat comparable “foreign” charities (meaning
charities which are established elsewhere in the EU but operate within the
borders of the Member State) equivalently to domestically established charities when it comes to tax exemption or relief,13 thereby facilitating the
growth of cross-border philanthropy.
And yet, it remains the case that the want of an appropriate treaty basis makes it difficult to regulate or legislate for non-profit organizations at a
European level. Without such a treaty basis, the EU institutionally is often
powerless to act and must instead rely either on the individual responses of
its Member States or proceed by way of soft law alternatives. On occasions
when the European Commission has sought to introduce enabling or oversight legislation for non-profits, the only treaty lifeline open to it has been
Article 352 of the TFEU.
The exercise of Article 352, while providing the Commission with the
required legislative basis, comes at a high price. It provides that if action by
the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies
defined in the treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the treaties,
and the treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining
the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate
measures. Unanimity amongst 28 Member States is, at best, difficult to
achieve. Failure to reach the necessary consensus can and does result in
entire proposals, regardless of their merit or support within the non-profit
sector, falling by the wayside. Attempts to adopt the EFS on the basis of
Article 352 have proved, if anything, to be a sobering experience for all
involved without the wished-for happy ending.
In February 2012, the European Commission published its Proposal
for a Council Regulation for a European Foundation Statute which, if
adopted, would provide a new and optional European legal structure for
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certain public benefit organizations.14 The road to this proposal was long,
stretching well back to European Commission public consultations in 2006
on Future Priorities for the Action Plan on Company Law and Corporate
Governance, 15 in which an impressive rate of 55% of the respondents to the
consultation unanimously endorsed the Commission’s proposal for a feasibility study on the need for a European Foundations Statute. 16 The securing
of Commission support for a feasibility study, subsequently published in
2009, 17 was the result of an impressive feat of non-profit lobbying in an
environment that up to that time had not proved amenable to non-profit
regulatory proposals. 18 This “one step forward” for European non-profit
regulation was accompanied by the proverbial “two steps back” for, in the
same year as the publication of the Future Priorities Report, the Commission withdrew its proposals for Regulations on the Statute for a European
Association (“ESA”) 19 and the statute for a European Mutual Society, 20
introduced in 1991, on the overarching grounds that they “were found not
to be consistent with the Lisbon and Better Regulation criteria, unlikely to
make further progress in the legislative process or found to be no longer
topical for objective reasons.” 21
A. Rationale for Proposal
According to proponents of the EFS proposal, European enabling legislation was essential not only for the future growth of cross-border philanthropy in Europe but to remove existing obstacles which denied
foundations the benefits of a common market enjoyed by their for-profit
counterparts. With an estimated 110,000 foundations in operation with

06/09/2016 10:30:17

14. See generally EUROPEAN COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE
STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN FOUNDATION (FE) (2012).
15. See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL MKT. & SERVS., CONSULTATION AND HEARING ON
FUTURE PRIORITIES FOR THE ACTION PLAN ON MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, SUMMARY REPORT (2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/consultation/final_report_en.pdf [hereinafter FUTURE
PRIORITIES REPORT].
16. Id. at 26.
17. UNIV. OF HEIDELBERG, CTR. FOR SOC. INV. & MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMPARATIVE AND
INT’L PRIVATE LAW, FEASIBILITY STUDY ON A EUROPEAN FOUNDATION STATUTE – FINAL REPORT
(2009),
http://efc.issuelab.org/resource/feasibility_study_on_a_european_foundation_statute_final_report?_ga=
1.151023292.448896650.1389109535 [hereinafter FEASIBILITY STUDY].
18. See Oonagh B. Breen, EU Regulation of Charitable Organizations: The Politics of Legally
Enabling Civil Society, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 50, 51 (2008).
19. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Association,
COM (1991) 273 final (Mar. 6, 1992) OJ C 99/1.
20. 1992 O.J. (C 99/40).
21. 2006 O.J. (C 64) 3.
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assets in excess of €1,000 billion in Europe alone, the feasibility study
found that over 67% of these bodies were engaged in international activity,
giving rise to a further growth in cross-border activity. 22 Foundations operating in more than one jurisdiction encountered additional costs (and often
difficulties) in establishing, registering and operating outside their home
territory. According to the study, the estimated costs of these legal barriers
amounted to between €101 million and €178 million per annum. 23
An enabling statute that would provide a common European vehicle
instantly recognized and accepted in all EU Member States and subject to a
common supervisory regime administered at a national level was thus an
appealing proposition to the European foundation sector. The promulgation
of the EFS by European regulation would ensure a European standard
throughout all Member States, creating for the first time an agreed definition of what constituted a public benefit entity for the purposes of crossborder philanthropy. However, the effect of such a definition would go
much further than merely removing national barriers to establishment but
would also set the parameters for both European supervision and enforcement of European foundation law on the one hand, and the awarding of
national tax exemption on the other.
The feasibility study considered five different models to overcome the
legal barriers to cross-border national foundation activity within the EU.
Of the five considered, the authors recommended as their preference “the
European Foundation Model with additional tax exemption” on the grounds
that:

This proposal formed the basis of the European Commission’s illfated 2012 proposal. Between the release of the feasibility study in 2009
and the publication of the Commission’s proposal in 2012, supporters of


FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 149.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 221.
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22.
23.
24.
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the EFS rallied together, explaining to the wider public as well as European
institutional bodies why an EFS was needed to enable trans-European philanthropic efforts to reach their potential. 25
B. Political Concerns and the Veto Block
The Commission’s 2012 proposal for the EFS was, at the very least,
an ambitious one. Two issues of particular concern gave rise to Member
State disquiet, namely the proposed definition of public benefit and the
provision for automatic and universal tax exemption for European Foundations (“FEs”). A third difficulty that arguably weakened Member State
consensus on the proposed EFS related, ironically, to the very nature of the
definition of “foundation” employed in the Commission’s proposal. Protracted negotiations on these issues weakened the momentum towards
promulgation and while these were not the only sticking points encountered
by the Commission in its attempt to guide the proposal through the European Council, it is arguable that these three matters are symptomatic of the
greater difficulties experienced in the EU when thoughts turn to European
non-profit regulation.
C. Defining Public Benefit – Pleasing Some of the People None of the
Time



06/09/2016 10:30:17

25. Gerry Salole, Why is the European Foundation Statute Needed?, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.
75, 75–84 (2008); EUROPEAN FOUND. CTR., IT’S TIME FOR A EUROPEAN FOUNDATION STATUTE (2011);
ALLIANCE PUBLISHING TRUST, PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE: A RICH PAST, A PROMISING FUTURE (Norine MacDonald & Luc Tayart de Borms eds., 2008); Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on
the Statute for a European Foundation, COM (2012) 035 final (Feb. 8, 2012).
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Among the most provocative features of the Commission’s proposed
regulation was the inclusion of a lowest common denominator definition of
“public benefit purpose” setting the parameters for what constituted a European notion of philanthropy, at least for cross border purposes. Part of the
challenge in this regard proved to be the difficulty of accommodating the
divergent concepts of common law and civil law philanthropy within the
one European regulatory definition. The common law approaches the concept of “charity” through the interpretational lenses of “charitable purpose”
and “public benefit.” Both of these terms have, over the centuries, been the
subject of judicial interpretation and more lately statutory (re)definition,
resulting in common law countries such as the United Kingdom and Ireland
enjoying a rich, if somewhat complex, toolkit for deciding whether an organization qualifies as charitable or not. Core to this charity test is the dual
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aspect of a list of defined charitable purposes and a requirement of sufficient benefit to the public. In contrast, civil law jurisdictions do not share
the common law concept of “charity” and the judicial traditions of these
jurisdictions are not dependent upon case law in the development of the
law as in Ireland and England. Given that the driving forces behind the EFS
were foundations based in civil law jurisdictions, it is perhaps unsurprising
that the proposed definition of a “public benefit purpose” fitted a civil law
perspective of the term. To this end, Article 5 of the EFS provided that a
public benefit purpose included:
(a) arts, culture or historical preservation;
(b) environmental protection;
(c) civil or human rights;
(d) elimination of discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation or any other legally prescribed
form of discrimination;
(e) social welfare, including prevention or relief of poverty;
(f) humanitarian or disaster relief;
(g) development aid and development cooperation;
(h) assistance to refugees or immigrants;
(i) protection of, and support for, children, youth or elderly;
(j) assistance to, or protection of, people with disabilities;
(k) protection of animals;
(l) science, research and innovation;
(m) education and training;
(n) European and international understanding;
(o) health, well-being and medical care;
(p) consumer protection;
(q) assistance to, or protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged persons;
(r) amateur sports;
(s) infrastructure support for public benefit purpose organizations.
This definition, however, was not co-extensive with the common law
definition of “charitable purpose.” It omitted, for instance, the advancement
of religion entirely; and the notion of being “exclusively” for charitable
purposes—an integral part of the common law test—was also absent from
early European drafts. Moreover, the use of the descriptor “public benefit
purpose” caused confusion for common law countries, devoid as it was of
the common law understanding of the essential tests for public benefit. The
fear was expressed that the new European usage of “public benefit” would
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be open to wide interpretation and could give rise to inconsistent applications under the national laws of different countries. Finding compromise
that could accommodate both the secular approach of certain civil law jurisdictions and the common law canons of interpretation regarding the parameters of philanthropy proved to be extremely difficult.
D. Taxing Questions – Competence, Sovereignty and Definition
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26. Cyprus took over the Presidency of the European Council from Denmark on July 1, 2012 and
was followed six months later by Ireland and then Lithuania. Lithuania handed over the EFS portfolio
to the Greek Presidency in January 2014 before finally the Italian Presidency dropped the EFS from its
legislative agenda in December 2014.
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Another arresting and ultimately troubling feature of the proposed
EFS was the provision for universal tax-exempt status of FEs by virtue of
their establishment so that “in all cases, [tax exemption] treatment should
be applied without any need for the FE or its donors or beneficiaries to
prove that the FE is equivalent to domestic public benefit purpose entities.”
In other words, existence as an FE per se would be sufficient for it to be
considered as an equivalent tax-exempt domestic charity, no further national inquiry being entertained. The EFS reversed the burden of proof that up
until this time had lain with the foreign charity to prove its tax equivalent
status to the tax authority of the host Member State. The automatic acceptance of tax legitimacy by virtue of the FE label proved to be extremely
controversial amongst Member States with the fear being that a host tax
authority would be forced to grant tax relief to an FE registered in another
Member State but active in the host country without having the ability to
scrutinize the latter’s purposes in the same way as it would scrutinize a
domestic charity applying under national law.
Tax law is an area in which the EU does not have competence to make
legally binding decisions that require Member State harmonization. The
Commission’s approach initially, at least, was that the EFS tax provisions
did not amount to tax harmonization but were rather an application of the
non-discrimination principles. However, the Member States’ strong attachment to the notion of national tax sovereignty coupled with discord
over the definitional scope of public benefit purpose entities led to a number of Member States vetoing these provisions.
The European Council began its scrutiny of the EFS proposal in April
2012, under the tenure of Danish Government. Although the issue remained on the agenda of the next three European Council Presidencies, 26
not even a subsequent compromise version of the tax provisions garnered
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unanimous agreement, leading to the Lithuanian Presidency ultimately
dropping the tax provisions from the proposal in November 2013. 27
E. ‘Foundation’ – What’s in a Name?
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27. The tax provisions contained in the proposal for a European Foundation Statute (EFS) were
officially withdrawn, following a meeting of COREPER—the group of EU Member States’ political
representatives—on November 8, 2013 in the aftermath of the presentation of the Lithuanian compromise text.
28. Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 94) (EC) (Council regulation of 8 October 2001
on the Statute for a European company (SE)).
29. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Statute for a
European Association, COD (1991) 0386, subsequently withdrawn by the Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Outcome of the Screening of
Legislative Proposals Pending before the Legislator, COM (2005) 462 final.
30. See EUROPEAN FOUND. CTR., http://www.efc.be (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
31. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation,
COM (2012) 35 final.
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A third challenge which came to light during the legislative scrutiny
process was the fact that the regulation focused on only one type of legal
vehicle—the foundation. While at first glance, this may not have seemed
problematic and indeed might have been viewed as a natural extension
from previous Commission proposals which had dealt respectively with the
creation of the European public companies 28 (successfully) and the European Association 29 (unsuccessfully), the type of foundation envisaged by
the EFS was very much a civil law concept. Given the number of active
European foundations, the vast majority of support for the EFS came from
continental Europe and the representative body for European foundations,
the European Foundation Centre. 30
The difficulty, however, was that in common law countries the foundation was less a legal concept and more a descriptive label. Typically,
charitable companies (namely, companies limited by guarantee) and charitable trusts were the legal vehicles of choice in common law countries
when it came to cross-border philanthropy. Both of these legal forms, however, fell outside the scope of the EFS proposal. Article 2 of the EFS proposal defined a “public benefit purpose entity” as: “   
 Ȁ  
  
ǳǤ31
Although the company limited by guarantee met the condition of incorporation, it had members whereas a trust, while not having members,
was unincorporated, placing both entities outside the functional definition
of an FE.
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For common law countries, therefore, the attractiveness of the EFS
proposal was more limited and it did not enjoy the groundswell of support
from the charity sector that might otherwise have prompted these Member
State governments to work harder at the proposal’s adoption.32 This lack of
fulsome support can be seen from the rather negative response of the British Minister for Employment Relations and Consumer Affairs to the Commission’s Consultation on Future Priorities in 2006 querying whether the
UK considered it a useful exercise to carry out the then proposed EFS feasibility study 33:
ȏȐ          
 Ǥ
  Ǥ Ǧ
   
  Ǥ        Ǧ
    Ǥ

The UK’s continued insistence on the EFS proposal’s irrelevance is
further evidenced by more recent 2015 correspondence between the Chairman of the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee and Rob Wilson
MP, Minister for Civil Society at the Cabinet Office, noting that the subcommittee was “pleased to see the Commission withdrawing proposals
where there is no realistic prospect of agreement in the Council” before
formally clearing the proposal from parliamentary scrutiny. 34
F. Structural Challenges and Lessons



06/09/2016 10:30:17

32. Attorney Gen., N. Ir., Colloquium on European Developments in Charity Law, Belfast (Feb.
28, 2014).
33. See Select Committee on European Union Fortieth Report, HOUSE OF LORDS (Mar. 28, 2006),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/187/187232.htm.
34. See Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister of Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, to the Chairman (July 1, 2015), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-subcom-e/cwm/CwMsubE31Mar-10Jul15.pdf.
35. See generally European Parliament Resolution of 2 July 2013 on the Proposal for a Council
Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE), EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 0035-2012/0022)
(2013).
36. See Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on “The Statute for a European Foundation,”
2013 O.J. (C 17/13); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal for a
Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE),” 2012 O.J. (C 351/13).
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One of the challenges of a co-decision legislative process, to which
the EFS proposal was subject, is getting all necessary parties on board
within an acceptable time frame. While proponents of the EFS proposal
managed to secure European parliamentary support 35 and support of the
regional and social committees, 36 European Council approval proved to be
beyond their reach. The legal requirement for Member State unanimity
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37. TRANSNATIONAL GIVING EUR., EUROPEAN FOUND. CTR., TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER
PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE AFTER PERSCHE AND STAUFFER: FROM LANDLOCK TO FREE MOVEMENT?
44 (2014) (noting that “[t]he landmark judgements (sic) of the European Court of Justice force Member
States not to discriminate [against] foreign EU-based public benefit organisations and their donors.
However, this study reveals that barriers continue to exist. Several Member States have not yet removed
discrimination and even where they have, problems remain. [Public Benefit Organisations] and their
donors encounter a lack of legal clarity, long and complicated procedures, and significant additional
translation and consultancy costs to show their comparable status. Within the EU no formal or uniform
approach to the comparability test is foreseen: Usually it is the competent tax authority who decides on
a case-by-case basis whether a foreign PBO is considered comparable to a domestic one.”).
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certainly hampered this process and while, undoubtedly, those who supported the EFS did well to keep the issue alive over the course of five successive Council presidencies, ultimately lack of sufficient progress on the
proposal tarnished its appeal for incoming Council presidents, who in their
short reign of six months aspire to leave behind a list of their own legislative achievements, rather than spend precious time negotiating around past
presidencies’ albatrosses. From a political perspective, therefore, unless the
next presidency shares your passion on the importance of advancing a legislative proposal or can reinvent your idea to make it their own, there is
little chance, in the absence of Member State consensus, of a proposal remaining on the agenda.
And yet, many of the problems that the EFS proposal set out to tackle
still remain. Cross border philanthropy does not fully enjoy the benefits of
the common market. Establishment and legal regulatory costs make it more
difficult for a charity to operate across jurisdictions in a tax-effective manner. 37 Matters are improving, thanks to ECJ jurisprudence and Commission
enforcement notices, but there is still some way to go. There was no appetite amongst Member State governments to invest the required resources in
the setting up of registration and supervision processes for the proposed
FE.
Until the EU works out at a macro level how best to support interstate
philanthropy and charitable giving and until it resolves at a European
Council level what purposes and activities fall within an agreed inclusive
European definition of public benefit entities, full regulatory enablement of
the sector will not be achieved. And this has consequences for regulation.
For effective regulation is only truly possible when the area to be regulated
is mapped and the ground rules are set as to who is covered and in what
situations. In the absence of a legal basis that requires less than unanimity,
it will remain extremely difficult for the Commission to create a European
non-profit enabling space within which to create a non-profit regulatory
framework that has buy-in across the EU.
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A. The Regulatory Context
Following the events of 9/11, the world and its institutions turned their
attention to the task of curtailing and preventing the funding of terrorism.
The non-profit sector was seen as particularly vulnerable to abuse by terrorist factions who might wish to launder money through innocent charities or
to set up bogus charities as fronts for terrorist activity and funding. For its
part, the UN Security Council issued Special Resolution 1373 in 2001,
which obliged all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, to
deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists, and to share information
about groups planning terrorist attacks. 38
Further effect was given to this goal by the FATF 39 passing in 2001 of
nine Special Recommendations aimed at countering terrorist financing. The
FATF was founded in 1989, comprising of 34 Member States, two regional
councils, 40 eight regional associate members and a host of observer bodies. 41 The FATF is an intergovernmental body charged with setting standards to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and
operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing
and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 42 Special Recommendation VIII (“SR VIII”) 43 focused on the vulnerabilities of the non-profit sector and tasked FATF Member States with
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38. S.C. Res. 1373, 4 (Sept. 28, 2001). Resolution 1373 was followed in 2013 by UN Security
Council Special Resolution 2129, which further recognized “the need for Member States to prevent the
abuse of non̻governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, and call[ed]
upon non-governmental, non-profit, and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate,
attempts by terrorists to abuse their status, while recalling the importance of fully respecting the rights
to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and freedom of religion or
belief, and noting the relevant recommendation and guidance documents of the Financial Action Task
Force.” S.C. Res. 2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
39. Described by Ben Hayes, civil society legal analyst, as “the most powerful agency you never
heard of”. KAY GUINANE, CIVICUS, GUEST ESSAY, THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING
SYSTEM’S NEGATIVE EFFECT ON CIVIL SOCIETY RESOURCES, STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT 251
(2015).
40. Namely, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
41. Including, inter alia, the UN, the World Bank and Interpol. For a full list of all members,
associates and observers see FATF Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
42. See About, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
43. FATF,
FATF
IX
SPECIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2001),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF Standards - IX Special Recommendations and IN rc.pdf
[hereinafter SR VIII]. In February, 2012, the FATF revised the 40 and the IX Recommendations. The
FATF integrated its nine special recommendations on the financing of terrorism into its 40 Recommendations. See Press Release, FATF, FATF Recommendation (2012), http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Press handout FATF Recommendations 2012.pdf (last visited Jan. 14,
2016).
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ensuring that their charity regulatory frameworks were robust enough to
withstand terrorist manipulation of their non-profit entities.44
The effect of SR VIII was to require all Member States to undertake
greater scrutiny and supervision of non-profit activity. In support of this
end, the FATF published a non-binding Best Practices Paper (“BPP”) in
2002 and a binding Interpretative Note on SR VIII in 2006, the purpose of
the latter being to define what constituted a non-profit organization and
what exactly SR VIII required. Ͷͷ The FATF’s standards, comprising of 40
standards on anti-money laundering measures and the nine standards countering terrorism funding, now represent an “essential element of the global
‘good governance’ agenda promoted by the United Nations, European Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and regional development banks.” 46
B. Greater Protection or Simply Excessive Regulation?
Attempts by many governments to give effect to SR VIII have resulted
(sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly) in the imposition of restrictive
laws that have reduced the enabling civic space in which non-profit organizations traditionally operate. In their 2012 Report, Legalising Surveillance,
Regulating Civil Society, StateWatch and the Transnational Institute examined the actions of 159 FATF Member States to give effect to SR VIII. 47 In
the words of the report’s preface, “the study shows that SR VIII has created
a system of onerous rules and regulations that have great potential to subject NPOs to excessive state regulation and surveillance, which restricts

06/09/2016 10:30:17

44. The wording of SR VIII provides:
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can
be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused:
(i) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose
of escaping asset freezing measures; and
(iii) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes to terrorist organisations.
SR VIII, supra note 43.
ͶͷǤ FATF, BEST PRACTICES: COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS
(RECOMMENDATION 8) (2015), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/BPP-combatingabuse-non-profit-organisations.pdf [hereinafter BPP].
46. STATEWATCH & HUMAN SECURITY COLLECTIVE, COUNTERING TERRORISM OR
CONSTRAINING CIVIL SOCIETY? THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
ON NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 4 (2015).
47. BEN HAYES, TRANSNATIONAL INST./STATEWATCH, COUNTER-TERRORISM, ‘POLICY
LAUNDERING’ AND THE FATF: LEGALISING SURVEILLANCE, REGULATING CIVIL SOCIETY (2012),
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-171-fafp-report.pdf (last accessed Oct. 16, 15) [hereinafter
LEGALISING SURVEILLANCE REPORT].
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their activities and thus the operational and political space of civil society
organizations.” 48
The Legalising Surveillance Report found that an unintended effect of
SR VIII’s evaluation system was to endorse some of the most restrictive
non-profit regulatory regimes in the world, while simultaneously providing
strong encouragement to some already repressive governments to introduce
new rules likely to restrict the political space in which NGOs and civil
society actors operate. 49 The report’s findings in this regard have been further corroborated by independent academic studies, reports published by
ICNL and Civicus 50 and interestingly, other global institutions. 51 The
World Bank, for instance, has questioned the suitability of SR VIII, noting
that:
          ǡ  Ǧ
         ǡ   
  ǡ in and of itselfǡ    
Ǥ 52
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48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 10.
50. See Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, 17 INT’L J.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5 (2015); GUINANE, supra note 39.
51. See, e.g., Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and
of association), Rep. submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council Resolution 24/5, 35, U.N.
Doc. A/69/365 (Sept. 1, 2014) noting “the battle against crime and terrorism has been used by some
States as a cover for imposing politically motivated restrictions on civil society funding. The Special
Rapporteur thus remains concerned about the risk of over-regulation that FATF recommendations
introduce (see A/HRC/23/39).”
52. Emile Van der Does de Willebois, Non-profit Organizations and the Combating of Terrorism
Financing a Proportionate Response 33 (World Bank Working Paper No. 208, 2010),
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821385470
53. Rutzen, supra note 50, at 10.
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In a wide-ranging and well-referenced work, Douglas Rutzen further
evidenced the adverse consequences of government regulation in this area,
identifying ten common regulatory practices introduced by governments
that have the direct or indirect effect of constraining the operating space for
civil society organizations. 53 Six of these measures arise in the context of
efforts at FATF compliance and include:
(1) requiring prior government approval to receive international funding;
(2) capping the amount of international funding that a CSO is allowed
to receive;
(3) requiring that international funding be routed through government-controlled entities;
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54. GUINANE, supra note 39.
55. See Spanish Royal Decree (B.O.E. 2014, 304), passing the Regulation of Act 10/2010 on
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing, which completes the implementation into
Spanish law of Directive 2005/60/EC.
56. See NGO Global Monitor: Uzbekistan, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW,
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html (last updated July 25, 2015).
57. Indian Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 2010 (India);
See India, COUNCIL OF FOUNDS. (last modified Oct. 2015), http://www.cof.org/content/india.
58. See FIN. SERVS. COMM’N, VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST
FINANCING
CODE
OF
PRACTICE,
2008
(2008),
http://www.bvifsc.vg/Portals/2/AntiMoney%20Laundering%20and%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Code%20of%20Practice,%202008.pdf
(consolidated by The Financial Services Commission on February 17, 2009). Fines range from $3000 to
$30,000 with fines of up to $10,000 for not keeping proper records. see ECNL ET AL., ILLUSTRATIVE
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(4) prohibiting CSOs from receiving international funding from specific donors;
(5) constraining international funding through the overly broad application of counterterrorism and anti-money laundering measures;
and
(6) imposing onerous reporting requirements on the receipt of international funding.
The practical effects of such measures are again highlighted in the recent Civicus State of Civil Society Report for 2015. In her guest essay in
that report, the Director of the non-profit Charity and Security Network,
Kay Guinane, referred to a number of legislative changes introduced by
countries as a result of their FATF evaluations, all of which result in excessive regulation of CSO funding. 54 These include:
x Spain’s passing of a new law requiring all NGO donations
over €1000 to be reported to the national government; 55
x Uzbekistan’s insistence that NGOs get approval for foreign
grants and report each financial transaction using these funds
to the Ministry of Finance on the next business day, no matter
how small the individual transaction;56
x India’s requirement that all CSOs receiving foreign contributions must report them to the central government within thirty
days of receipt; 57
x In response to its FATF evaluation, the British Virgin Islands
passed a law requiring CSOs with more than five employees
to appoint a Money Laundering Reporting Officer. Those with
less than five staff need not appoint a separate officer but are
still required to perform the Money Laundering Reporting Officer functions. Stiff fines are imposed for the failure to maintain any records required to be maintained. 58
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More recently, in a further indictment of the FATF’s exercise of its
regulatory role, the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism chided the FATF for missing opportunities to highlight
when national legislative efforts to comply with SR VIII were at variance
with international human rights law. In the words of Special Rapporteur
Ben Emerson, “in its peer review processes, the Task Force has rarely criticized overregulation and lack of respect for human rights, focusing instead
on cases of insufficient regulation.” 59
C. FATF Evaluation – Understanding the Process
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LIST OF OVERREGULATION OF NGOS: FOR DISCUSSION AT ICNL’S GLOBAL FORUM 2015 (2015),
http://www.icnl.org/globalforum2015/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Illustrative-List-of-Overregulationof-NGOs.pdf.
59. Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism), Rep. submitted in accordance with Assembly resolution 68/178 and Human Rights Council resolutions 15/15, 19/19, 22/8, and 25/7, 36, U.N. Doc.
A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015).
60. See supra note 50.
61. FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports can be accessed online at Topic: Mutual Evaluations,
FATF,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc%28fatf_releasedate%29
(last visited Oct. 23, 15).
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The peer review process mentioned by Special Rapporteur Emerson
occurs in the context of the FATF mutual evaluation process. Unpacking
how this process works is a useful exercise in better understanding the driving forces that have contributed to the introduction of the types of regulatory measures, referred to by Guinane and Rutzen above, 60 and the
consequent foreclosing of civil society space.
Member State compliance with the FATF’s recommendations is monitored in a two-step process. Each member carries out an initial selfassessment of compliance, which is followed up by a peer-to-peer mutual
evaluation process and report. Based on the level of country compliance
with the key FATF recommendations, reports, prepared by a team of financial, legal and law enforcement experts from other countries, rate countries
as being somewhere on the scale between “compliant,” “largely compliant,” “partially compliant” or “non-compliant.” The final reports are made
publicly available and indicate the necessary steps required to be taken by a
country if its compliance with the FATF recommendations falls short.61
The time between Mutual Evaluation Reports depends on the health of a
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country’s assessment, with more frequent re-evaluations occurring of less
compliant countries. 62
When it comes to compliance rates with SR VIII (now “R8”), the Legalising Surveillance Report’s 2012 review of the Mutual Evaluation Reports of 159 countries found that 63:
 ȏȐǤǤǤǮǯȂǡǡ ǡǦ
    Ȃ    Ǯ    Ǧ
  ǯǤͳ 
    Ǯ ǯǡ  Ǯ  Ǧ
ǡ          
ǯǤǤǤǤͳͷͻ
ȂͺͷΨȂ Ǯ Ǧ
ǯǮǦ ǯǤǮ ǯȋͳͷͻ ǡ
 ͶʹΨȌ    Ǯ       Ǧ
        ǯǢ ǮǦ
ǯ ȋͻ  ͳͷͻ ǡ  Ͷ͵ΨȌ  Ǯ  Ǧ
ǡ ǯǤ

The low levels of compliance and the need for better engagement between the regulators and the regulated was further emphasized in the 2013
report prepared by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
(“CGCC”), following a two-year project led by the United Nations and
aimed at developing a common understanding of sound practices to counter
the risk of terrorism financing through the non-profit sector. 64 The project
included two global-level meetings and five regional-level expert meetings.
More than 50 states and 80 NPOs participated in the meetings, in addition
to representatives of relevant UN and multilateral agencies, officials from
the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (“FSRBs”), and the financial
sector. 65 One of the key findings of the CGCC report was the need for the
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62. Thus by way of example, Australia’s 3rd Mutual Evaluation Report in 2005 concluded that the
country was compliant with 12 Recommendations; largely compliant with 14; partially compliant with
13; and non-compliant with 10. Rated as compliant or largely compliant with 13 of the 16 Core and Key
Recommendations, Australia was placed under the regular follow-up process immediately after the
adoption of this report. However, due to the lack of progress, it was placed under the enhanced followup process in February 2012, a process it exited in June 2014, having achieved a satisfactory level of
compliance with all Core and Key Recommendations. See FATF, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT
AUSTRALIA (2015).
63. LEGALISING SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 47.
64. GLOB. CTR. ON COOPERATIVE SEC., TO PROTECT AND PREVENT: OUTCOMES OF A GLOBAL
DIALOGUE TO COUNTER TERRORIST ABUSE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, § v (2013) (noting that “Understanding and awareness about the risk of terrorism financing in the non-profit sector is uneven
globally, and levels of compliance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 8 are
low. Yet, there is consensus on the key elements of an effective response, including the need for a riskbased approach that identifies and mitigates the risk of terrorism financing, proportionality, outreach to
the sector, and engagement on a whole-of-government basis across relevant government agencies.”).
65. Launched at an initial expert working-group meeting held in London in January 2011, the
initiative consisted of five regional workshops, held in Bangkok (March 2011), Auckland (November
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active participation of the non-profit sector to help build relationships of
trust and confidence in emerging regulatory frameworks 66 and it is to the
actualization of this finding that the next section now turns, first by considering briefly the EU Commission’s past efforts to comply with R8 before
turning to the latest efforts of civil society to refashion the FATF non-profit
relationship of engagement.
D. The European Union Response
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2011), Nairobi (March 2012), Buenos Aires (November 2012) and Doha (January 2013), respectively.
The aims of the initiative were to bring together experts from Member States, the non-profit sector and
relevant international and regional organizations to discuss the risk of terrorism financing abuse in a
regional context, to foster cooperation in that regard, and to promote the sharing of good practices.
66. See supra note 64.
67. Council of the European Union, Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing No. 11778/1/08 REV 1 of 17 July 2008, 8.
68. Commission of the European Communities, The Prevention of and Fight Against Terrorist
Financing through Enhanced National Level Coordination and Greater Transparency of the Non-Profit
Sector, COM (2005) 620 final (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Commission Communication (2005) 620
final].
69. Council Declaration C/05/187 of 13 July 2005, following the London bombings, had already
asked the EU to “agree a Code of Conduct to prevent misuses of charities by terrorists.” (available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-05-187_en.pdf).
70. Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 68, at 12.
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“Since non-profit organisations frequently have an international profile, it is necessary to find international solutions, notably at EU level, as a
complement to domestic measures.” 67 As a regional FATF member in its
own right, the European Commission itself has experienced difficulties in
the past in giving full effect to R8. Its first efforts in 2005 took the form of
a Commission Communication (from DG Justice), recommending, inter
alia, a Framework for a Code of Conduct to enhance transparency and accountability of NPOs and to reduce the risk of abuse of the non-profit sector. 68 The Communication made recommendations to EU Member States as
well as to NPOs, to “verify the identity and good faith of their beneficiaries, donors and associate NPOs,” and “keep full and accurate audit trails of
funds transferred outside their jurisdiction.” The code request was prompted both by R8 and by European Council declarations following the 2005
London bombings. 69 Although conceding that “the Framework for a Code
of Conduct should not in any way hinder legal cross border activities of
NPOs,” and declaring that “the aim of the European approach is thus to
establish common principles on which national implementation can be
based,” 70 the Commission provided no guidance on how these common
principles were to be achieved and following non-profit concerns, the code
was never implemented.
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Nonetheless, in its 2009 Communication on the draft Stockholm Programme, the Commission focused on the need at European level to regulate
non-profits:
 
   
      Ǥ    
   
Ǥ 71
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71. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: An Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice serving the Citizen, at 23, COM (2009) 262 final (June 10, 2009).
72. Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe
Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010 O.J. (C 115).
73. See European Commission, Discussion Paper on Voluntary Guidelines for EU Based Nonprofit Organisations (July 2, 2010).
74. Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 68.
75. For a full account of the content of the Discussion Paper and the background to civil societyEU relations at the time, see ǤǡThrough the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on
Non-Profit Vulnerability, Legitimacy and Regulationǡ͵Ǥ Ǥ ǯǤͻͶǡ976 (2011).
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The Stockholm Programme set out a five-year framework for the EU
in the area of justice and home affairs. Negotiated by the European Council, the final version, published in 2010, mandated the Commission “to
promote increased transparency and responsibility for charitable organisations with a view to ensuring compatibility with Special Recommendation
(SR) VIII of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).” 72 Part of the difficulty for the Commission, as we have already seen in the context of the
EFS, is the expectation that it will act in an area in which it lacks a legal
basis for European non-profit regulation per se. Thus, finding the mechanism through which to give satisfactory expression to the goals of R8 has
proven somewhat challenging.
Realizing perhaps its legislative limitations, the Commission sought to
develop and introduce voluntary anti-terrorist financing guidelines for EUbased non-profit organizations to achieve R8 regulatory compliance. The
substantive principles to this effect, outlined in a Commission Discussion
Paper of 2010 73 that largely reflected the Commission’s earlier 2005 Communication proposals, 74 found little favor, however, with non-profit respondents.
The Commission’s desire to limit consultation on the 2010 Discussion
Paper to a select group of invited non-profits and Member State representatives did little to endear it to the broader non-profit community who were
neither given access to the Discussion Paper nor invited to comment upon
it. 75 Public disclosure of the matters under discussion and dissemination of
civil society’s perspective occurred only to the extent that invited non-
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profits were prepared to publish their responses (along with copies of the
Discussion Paper). In one such published response, the European Centre
for Not-for-Profit Law (“ECNL”) sought to clarify the role of the Commission in relation to the non-profit sector and the context for the Discussion
Paper. 76 Citing the purpose of the guidelines as being “to encourage NPOs
to review their internal rules, to increase awareness about potential terrorism abuse and thus reduce the risk of NPOs’ possible abuse for terrorist
financing purposes,” 77 ECNL advanced the view that achievement of this
goal could only occur if the Commission dropped its prescriptive tone as a
regulator and became instead an enabler of civil society. ECNL urged the
Commission to act as a convener to bring Member States and their best
practices together to be shared precisely because of the lack of specific
regulation at EU level that could otherwise serve as a reference point for
the guidelines. 78
To date, despite promises of further and wider consultation on the
matter, the Commission’s voluntary guidelines, intended for release in
2011, 79 have yet to be published in their final form. The webpage of the
Commission’s Directorate General for Home Affairs however still states
that, “Voluntary guidelines for the sector could be a means to enhance
transparency and accountability of NGOs and to reduce their potential
abuse for terrorist financing. The Commission aims to closely involve the
NGO sector and EU States in its work in this field.” 80
E. To the Barricades: Reclaiming the Concept of Civic Space
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76. ECNL, COMMENTS ON THE DISCUSSION PAPER ‘VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR EU BASED
NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS’ (2010).
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. at 4.
79. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering an area of
freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, at 40, COM (2010) 171 final (Apr. 20, 2010).
80. See Financing, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/financing/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 15).
81. See Bjorn S. Aamo, Pres., FATF, Address at the 40th Plenary Meeting of the Committee Of
Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Mon-
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The first formal engagement on a bilateral basis between the FATF
and interested non-profits on the reform of R8 took place on April 24, 2013
when the FATF hosted a consultation and dialogue meeting with non-profit
organizations in London. That engagement, which followed a 2012 commitment by the Norwegian FATF presidency to enter in dialogue with nonprofits regarding the implementation of R8,81 may well itself have been
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prompted by the ongoing multilateral successes of the CGCC project, 82 in
which both the FATF and non-profits participated. This renewed prioritization of sector engagement was certainly welcomed with interest by all participants in the CGCC project in their final multi-lateral meeting in New
York in March 2013. 83
A positive outcome of the April 2013 London bilateral meeting was
the adoption by the FATF of a limited update of the International Best
Practices Paper: Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations, 84
which included a highlighting of the message that measures to protect
NPOs from misuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable
activities. In his letter to NPO participants in June 2013 informing them of
progress made subsequent to the April meeting, the FATF President, Bjorn
Aamo, expressly acknowledged the contribution of the NPO representatives to the process and welcomed their input into the preparation of the
planned NPO Typologies Paper. 85
The involvement of non-profits in this latter process was well coordinated, pitched at a high-level, and produced strong working papers and
substantive suggestions. A number of NGO coalitions developed around
these issues at both a European regional level and a transnational international level, resulting in the formation of a Non-profit Platform on the
FATF. Funded by the Open Society Foundation and co-facilitated by
ECNL in Budapest, the European Foundation Centre (“EFC”) in Brussels,
the Human Security Collective (“HSC”) in The Hague and the Charity &
Security Network (“CSN”) in Washington, D.C., the coalition sought to
give voice and structure to non-profit contributions. 86 To this end, a self-
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eyval), Development of the Global Network and other key elements of FATF work under the Norwegian
Presidency
(Dec.
3,
2012),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/developmentoftheglobalnetworkandotherkeyelementsoffatf
workunderthenorwegianpresidency.html.
82. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
83. Ctr. On Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Preventing Terrorist Abuse of the Non-Profit
Sector: Summary Observations (Working Document, Final Expert Working Group Meeting on Preventing Terrorist Financing Abuse of the Non-profit Sector in New York Mar. 5-7, 2013),
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/briefings/2013/npo/docs/working-document-4-5feb.pdf.
84. BPP, supra note 45 (first published in 2002, subsequently revised in 2013 and 2015).
85. Letter from FATF on Best Practices Paper on Recommendation 8 to All NPO Participants of
the FATF Consultation and Dialogue Meeting with Non-Profit Organisations (June 25, 2013) (noting
“it is without a doubt that the work of the FATF on this paper has benefitted extensively from the April
2013 Consultation meeting and the written comments that we received from the NPO sector after the
Consultation meeting. . . I once again thank you for your constructive cooperation over the past year on
this important update.”).
86. See About Us, FATF PLATFORM, http://fatfplatform.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
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styled Transnational NPO Working Group on FATF submitted recommendations to the FATF on the proposed Typology Review in February 2014. 87
The key recommendations made were that the typologies should be
evidence based; they should distinguish between potential risk (i.e., vulnerability) and actual abuse; they should recognize the diverse structures and
functions of NPOs and avoid an overbroad definition of terrorist financing;
and they should recognize risk mitigation procedures employed by the
NPO sector. 88 The FATF provided the Transnational NPO Working Group
with an opportunity to respond to the draft report in June 2014.
Published in June 2014, the Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-profit Organisations Report sought to examine in detail how and where NPOs were
at risk of terrorist abuse. 89 Using case studies as well as input collected
from law enforcement, other government actors and non-profits themselves, the report was intended to increase awareness of the methods and
risk of abuse for terrorism of the non-profit sector, both domestically and
internationally and to serve as a basis for a more comprehensive revision of
the Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations (Recommendation 8). 90 The final report included several of the recommendations advanced by the Transnational NPO Group, most
particularly reference to: a) the positive role played by civil society in increasing human security worldwide; and b) the special protections the sector has under international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. 91 Outstanding issues not adequately addressed by the Typologies Report, however, remained in the form of concerns of the frequent conflation
of vulnerability and risk of abuse in the substance of the report. 92

Building on the momentum created by this engagement over the past
twelve months, non-profit coalitions have engaged both directly and proactively with the FATF in the revisions of the Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations (“BPP”), but also indirectly
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87. See TRANSNATIONAL NPO WORKING GROUP ON FATF, RECOMMENDATIONS: FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE TYPOLOGY REVIEW
(Feb.
2014),
http://fatfplatform.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/NPO-Sector-Typology-Position-Paper-FATF.pdf.
88. Id.
89. FATF, RISK OF TERRORIST ABUSE IN NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS (2014).
90. BPP, supra note 45.
91. Letter from the Transnational NPO Working Group to Co-Chairs of the RTM Working Group
and to the FATF/GAFI Secretariat (Aug. 7, 2014) (on file with author).
92. Id.
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93. See, e.g., Lia van Broekhoven, Initial NPO Input into FATF Revision of the R8 ‘Best Practices Paper’, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (2014),
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/files/2014%20dec%2018%20Core%20Group%20s
ubmission%20to%20the%20BPP%20review(1).pdf) (noting that the sharing of these non-profit recommendations with the FATF Secretariat arose from the latter’s invitation and in light of preceding
discussions between non-profit coalitions and FATF officials in Paris in October 2014).
94. Id. The Private Sector Consultative Forum plays an important role in fostering effective
implementation of the FATF Recommendations by bringing together representatives of sectors that are
subject to AML/CFT requirements (the financial sector and other designated businesses and professions), civil society, and policy makers to discuss issues of common interest. See, e.g., Dialogue with
the Private Sector, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/private-sector-forum-march2015.html (last visited Nov. 3, 15).
95. See FATF, Draft Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations
(Recommendation 8) 20 (Working Draft, FATF Consultation and Dialogue Meeting with Non-Profit
Organisations in Brussels, Belgium Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/system/files/files/NPO-BPP-PostPDG-ToNPOinviteesFINAL%20(1)(1).pdf.
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through the channels of the EU Commission and U.S. Treasury to bring
pressure on the FATF to be more transparent in its dealings and deliberations. The value of these inputs can be seen in the documents released by
some of these collectives, which document the iterative process that preceded and influenced the revised BPP, published in June 2015.93 The detailed nature and high quality of these initial non-profit recommendations
gave weight to the coalition’s call for “continuous formal consultation between the NPO sector and FATF, including participation in the Private
Sector Consultative Forum.” 94
In their initial recommendations to the FATF, the Transnational NPO
Working Group proposed a number of reforms to the 2013 BPP to adopt a
targeted approach towards the implementation of R8 rather than a one-sizefits-all approach and calling for proportionality in risk mitigation measures.
The draft Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations, released by the FATF in March 2015, took account of these
particular concerns, giving effect to them specifically in paragraphs 7a, b
and e (dealing with targeted approaches), paragraph 21 (dealing with proportionality), a new section V (dealing with access to financial services)
and the separate creation of an annex of examples of good NPO practices
with the express admonition that such examples were not to be treated as a
formal checklist of required practices, much to the satisfaction of the NPO
Working Group. 95
Much less to the satisfaction of the Working Group, however, was the
consultation process undertaken by the FATF in relation to the March 2015
draft. The draft paper was released on a strictly confidential basis only to
the invitees of the FATF Consultation and Dialogue Meeting with NPOs
held in Brussels on March 25, 2015. The draft BPP expressly stated that it
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was “not for further distribution to any persons outside or within your organisations.” 96 As noted by the Working Group’s April 2015 response to
the draft BPP:
ȏȐ             
        Ǥ  
  ǯ   Ǥ 

  ȏǡȐ
 ǤȏǡȐ
            
Ǥ 97

It is interesting to note the reference here to the inclusive role of the
European Commission in this process, which was a far cry from the Commission’s aforementioned poor consultative record in respect of its own
Discussion Paper on Voluntary Guidelines in 2010. 98 It remains an open
question as to whether this commendably facilitative approach—which
borders on the convener role earlier urged upon the Commission by
ECNL—will become the norm for all future Commission direct engagement with NPOs or whether such an approach is only likely to be adopted
when the Commission is a participant (as opposed to lead negotiator) in a
related FATF consultation.
G. Non-profit Gains in FATF Regulatory Space: The Return of the
Jedi?
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96. Id. at 2.
97. FATF, Joint NPO Comments on FATF Draft Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse
of Non-Profit Organisations (Recommendation 8) 2 (Working Draft as of Mar. 2015, Apr. 24, 2015).
98. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
99. Outcomes of the Plenary Meeting of the FATF, Brisbane, 24-26 June 2015, FATF,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenary-june2015.html
(last
visited Nov. 6, 15).
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Reflecting for a moment on the outcomes of recent FATF engagement
with the non-profit sector in its review of R8 compliance practices, one
might query whether FATF oversight was under siege from the sector and
wonder to the extent that it might have been, what victories, if any, did the
non-profit insurgents secure for their efforts. Perhaps one of the most tangible outcomes has been the FATF’s announcement that in the future it will
hold an annual formal consultation with non-profit organizations on specific issues of common interest and that it will organize ad hoc exchanges on
technical matters. 99 The announcement was made at the FATF’s plenary
meeting in Brisbane in June 2015, the same meeting that saw the publication of the revised BPP.
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100. See Public Consultation on the Revision of the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 (Nonprofit Organisations), FATF (Nov. 6, 2015),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/public-consultation-npoinr8.html in which the FATF especially welcomed the views of the NPO sector “in order to ensure that
practical knowledge and experience, in particular from service NPOs, can be properly reflected in the
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8.”
101. See GLOBAL NPO COALITION ON FATF, COMMENTS ON THE FATF ON THE OPEN, PUBLIC
COMMENT PROCESS, SEEKING INPUT FROM NPOS ON REVISION OF THE INTERPRETIVE NOTE (IN) FOR
RECOMMENDATION 8 (2015),
http://fatfplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/GlobalCoalitionCommentsINRevision.pdf.
102. The FATF will meet in February 2016 to review consultation feedback received before
determining the next steps towards finalizing the Interpretive Note to R8 later in 2016.
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Arguably, the direct engagement of the non-profit coalition on both
the revisions of the BPP and the preparation of the Typologies Paper has
given the FATF a far greater appreciation of the sector’s capacity to contribute to R8 reform in an effective manner, leading to the promise of more
formal future ongoing engagement. With the recent conclusion in November 2015 of an FATF public consultation on a proposed revision of the
Interpretive Note to R8 to take account of the new Typologies Report and
revised BPP, 100 the opportunity to give effect to this promise awaits to be
fulfilled. Non-profits have responded to the FATF’s call for feedback;101
the extent to which the FATF will take these views on board in its revised
note remains to be seen. 102
One interesting feature of the FATF non-profit engagement has been
the willingness of nonprofits to engage in their own regulation—nonprofits
have not been averse to regulation but have sought good regulation that
respects the principles of freedom of association and assembly and that is
proportionate in application and enforcement. The sector’s challenging of
the broad statements of the FATF regarding the vulnerability of the entire
NPO sector and development of NPO typology has the rationalizing effect
of drawing to the regulator’s attention the fact that if a sham/complicit organization is more correctly defined as a non-NPO, then imposition of
greater regulation on NPOs in general will not solve the problem at hand,
as such non-NPOs will not be caught.
Similarly, NPO awareness of the political implications of confusing
concepts of “risk” and “vulnerability” and the potential adverse impact of
document lists that become viewed as checklists or isolated case studies
that become accepted as the norm for the sector without any empirical evidence of their prevalence is extremely refreshing. It challenges the regulator to a) become more accountable and transparent; b) to distinguish
between useful illustrative examples and policy statements; and c) to engage in better crafted drafting so that FATF terms are clear and precise and
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set out clearly when action is not required as much as when it is. Admittedly, non-profits have not won this latter battle yet.
A win-win for the FATF that comes out of this non-profit engagement
must be the realization of the regulatory gains that can be made when a
regulator’s oversight is under siege. One area in which this is particularly
relevant is the current discussions over R8 and the issue of de-risking. Derisking refers to the phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or
restricting business relationships with clients or categories of clients to
avoid, rather than manage, risk in line with the FATF’s risk-based approach. In the words of the FATF,
Ǧ            
ǡ 
   ǡ       
Ǥǡ   Ǧ
    Ǧ Ȁ  
 ȋȀ ȌǤ 103

This is a particular concern for certain non-profits either because of
the conflict areas in which they work—e.g., Somalia or Syria, or because of
the nature of the charity—e.g., Islamic charities, in particular. 104 These
charities have found themselves victims in a banking system that has
sought to close their accounts as the easiest way to ensure compliance with
the CFT standards of bodies such as the FATF. The latest report from the
Overseas Development Institute highlights the dangers of over-regulation
in this regard:

The 2015 revision of the BPP guidance on “Access of NPOs to Financial Services” was informed by NGO insights and evidence of the practical



06/09/2016 10:30:17

103. FATF Clarifies Risk-based Approach: Case-by-case, Not Wholesale De-risking, FATF (Oct.
23 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/rba-and-de-risking.html.
104. See, for instance, Mark Tran, Somalis Fear Barclays Closure of Remittance Accounts Will
Cut
Lifeline,
GUARDIAN
(June
24
2013),
www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2013/jun/24/somalis-barclays-remittance.
105. Victoria Metcalfe-Hough et al., UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism: Perceptions
and
Reality
13
(Humanitarian
Pol’y
Grp.,
Working
Paper,
2015),
http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9479.pdf.
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effects of banks’ de-risking. 106 The wording of the BPP to the effect that
“financial institutions should not view NPOs (as that term is defined by
FATF) as high risk simply because they may operate in cash-intensive
environments or in countries of great humanitarian need”107 coupled with
BPP advice to banks when assessing the potential risk of an NPO to take
into account:
Ȍ             
Ǣ
Ȍǡ 
   Ȁ ǡ Ǧ
 ǡ Ǧ
 ǡ         
  108

is very much driven by non-profit dialogue and experience in this regard.
The extent to which future successes are possible will only become
apparent over time as the next round of Mutual Evaluation Reports are
carried out. To this end, a watching brief must be kept on the compliance
rates of Member States with R8 balanced against the introduction of new
proscriptive national regulations ostensibly warranted by FATF but adversely affecting non-profit activity. If the advice of UN Special Rapporteur Emerson is heeded, evaluators will need clear guidance to aid their
interpretation of R8 and the courage to identify and call out instances of
Member State wrongful reliance on FATF principles to curtail civic space
rather than to protect against the threat of terrorist financing.

The capacity for bespoke European regulation of non-profit organizations remains, at least to this author’s mind, a distant and remote prospect.
European regulation is not, nor should it be, impossible when approached
on a functional basis. Thus, where the prescription (or indeed, proscription)
relates to the structure, operations or substantive activity in which the EU
has competence to regulate (be it competition law, labor law, workers’
rights etc.) the fact that such regulation affects non-profit as well as forprofit actors will be a matter of little importance. It is when the focus of the
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106. Further evidence of the dangers of derisking for the non-profit sector can be seen in TOM
KEATINGE, DEMOS UNCHARITABLE BEHAVIOUR (2014),
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/DEMOSuncharitablebehaviourREPORT.pdf?1419986873.
107. BPP, supra note 45, at [68].
108. Id. at [69].
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regulation is upon the activities of non-profits qua non-profits, as we have
seen, that difficulties in terms of European competence (in the narrow
sense) and European consensus (in the broader European Member State
context) will arise.
This article has sought to shed light on some of the underlying factors
that inform these regulatory misadventures. The lack of an available legal
treaty basis forcing non-profit regulation into the straitjacket of Council
unanimity is not aided by the traditional cultural and legal divergences that
exist within a community of 28 Member States. Even when these cultural
differences can be overcome, the regulatory areas of most interest frequently border on those areas most sensitive to Member State sovereign control
(e.g., tax policy) or seek to impose new regulatory regimes in areas in
which many Member States have yet to work out their own robust regimes
(e.g., the effective regulation of charities). The six-month rotation of the
presidency of the European Council results in the existence of a short-term
policy window such that only those legislative proposals for which there is
the greatest collective need or priority will remain on the policy and legislative agenda. To end here would thus give credence to the view that European regulation of non-profits is simply an empty promise.
And yet, the facilitative role of the European Commission in the recent non-profit drive to reform FATF regulation of non-profit activities
does open up a glimmer of opportunity. It raises the potential for the Commission to use its capacity as a convener of Member States, coupled with
its broad understanding of potential non-profit vulnerability to terrorist
financing in the cross border philanthropy arena, to raise NGO governance
standards while simultaneously reducing the potential for over-zealous
FATF over-regulation. It is too early to tell whether this quixotic chimera
can be attained or whether we are simply tilting at windmills in our quest
for a European regulator.
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